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Abstract. This proposal aims to combine the best properties of paper-
based and end-to-end veriﬁable remote voting systems. Ballots are de-
livered electronically to voters, who return their votes on paper together
with some cryptographic information that allows them to verify later
that their votes were correctly included and counted.
We emphasise the ease of the voter’s experience, which is not much
harder than basic electronic delivery and postal returns. A typical voter
needs only to perform a simple check that the human-readable printout
reﬂects the intended vote. The only extra work is adding some crypto-
graphic information into the same envelope as the human-readable vote.
The proposed scheme is not strictly end-to-end veriﬁable, because it
depends on procedural assumptions at the point where the ballots are
received. These procedures should be public and could be enforced by a
group of observers, but are not publicly veriﬁable afterwards by observers
who were absent at the time.
Keywords: electronic voting, veriﬁability, postal voting, vote by mail,
end-to-end veriﬁable voting.
1 Introduction
There are no good options for voters unable to visit a polling place. Snail mail is
slow, unreliable and easily intercepted, but it has one great advantage: ordinary
people can see clearly what they have sent. This is the same advantage that
has made a human-readable paper trail a focus of attempts to improve the
integrity of polling-place DRE voting machines. Voters all over the world are
clamouring for a substitute for postal voting, with its numerous inconveniences.
Postal voting is also much less secure than attendance paper voting, being more
susceptible to both privacy compromise and vote manipulation. It struggles to
satisfy fast delivery requirements, in two directions, over what can be a very slow
channel. Many people who haven’t thought much about electronic security think
that Internet voting is a great alternative. It’s a pity about the human-readable
paper record though.
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One obvious improvement to postal voting is to deliver ballot information
electronically and then ask voters to return paper votes by mail [JS12]. This
cuts out the diﬃcult half of the snail-mail delivery, and provides simple cast-
as-intended veriﬁcation, but it gives no more guarantees than ordinary postal
voting of privacy, delivery, or accurate counting.
An alternative approach is to use cryptography to mitigate the vulnerabilities
of (Internet-based) electronic voting. End-to-end veriﬁable systems such as He-
lios [Adi08] provide proofs that all the votes were counted as cast and correctly
tallied. The most diﬃcult part is allowing voters to verify that their votes were
cast as they intended, even given the possible presence of malware on their com-
puters. Helios voters are encouraged to perform a randomised protocol to test
whether the vote is recorded in the way they intended. If the voters perform the
protocol correctly, they get very good evidence that their vote was cast as they
intended. It isn’t necessary for all voters to perform this check—the important
point is that a manipulating machine risks detection unless it can be conﬁdent
the voter won’t check. There is therefore a key assumption that regardless of
the voter, a Helios client will never have prior certainty that the voter will not
perform a check. Whether this assumption is valid depends, at least in part,
on the population of voters. The IACR election is highly likely to have a large
enough population of sophisticated voters that any cheating attempt has a high
probability of detection. However, for some ordinary voters in government elec-
tions, it could be much easier for a malicious machine to predict that the voter
will not check, or to trick them into not checking.
Our proposal is to try to get the best of both worlds, with a simple cast-as-
intended check for most voters and a veriﬁable protocol demonstrating correct
inclusion and counting. The scheme uses both an electronic and a snail-mail
channel — blending the best properties of each.
We emphasise the ease of the voter’s experience, which is not much harder
than basic electronic delivery and postal returns. The extra cryptographic infor-
mation needs only to be added into the same envelope as the human-readable
vote. Mechanisms for assisting voters with disabilities could easily be incorpo-
rated into the process of ﬁlling in the ballot by computer (though not quite so
easily into the process of putting the printouts in an envelope and posting it).
The proposal provides a set of security properties not obtainable on other remote
systems with such an easy voting experience.
The proposed scheme is not strictly end-to-end veriﬁable, because it depends
on procedural assumptions at the point where the ballots are received. These
procedures should be public and could be enforced by a group of observers, but
are not publicly veriﬁable afterwards by observers who were absent at the time.
1.1 Related Work
A completely diﬀerent approach is Code Voting [Cha01], in which voters receive
a code sheet in the mail and then use codes to communicate their choices to the
electoral authorities via an untrusted electronic device, or to check via a return
code that the authorities received the correct choice. This style of remote voting
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has been used in government elections, for example in Norway [Gj10]. Chaum’s
original code voting scheme assumed an honest electoral authority. Although
subsequent works have weakened this assumption substantially, all code voting
schemes still require a secrecy assumption for the integrity of the election. In
other words, a malicious device that learns the codes can manipulate the vote.
PGD [RT13] allows the code information to be generated in a distributed way,
and Remotegrity [ZCC+13] uses physical protections such as scratch strips to
protect the data in transit, but there are still strong assumptions about the se-
curity of the (postal) delivery system. Furthermore, code schemes are diﬃcult to
use when the ballot is complex, such as in IRV/STV elections with many pref-
erences [HRT10]. Our proposed system works for any voting or tallying scheme.
One interesting diﬀerence is that code-based schemes send out a piece of paper
and then receive the vote electronically, while our proposal sends ballot infor-
mation electronically and then requires a paper return.
Two polling-place voting systems elegantly combine human-readable paper
records with end-to-end veriﬁcation. In the Wombat voting system [RTsRBN],
voters produce both human-readable and encrypted versions of their votes. Be-
cause Wombat is an attendance voting system, the process of reconciling and
then separating the two representations is performed by the voter, using a pro-
cess similar to Benaloh’s simple veriﬁable elections [Ben06]. In the StarVote
system proposed for Austin, TX, [BBK+12], voters make both human-readable
plaintext representations and encrypted representations, check that the former
matches their intentions, and then either cast or audit their ballots. In addition,
the plaintext representation is part of a risk-limiting audit in the style of SOBA
[BJL+11]. Our question is how to achieve a similar set of security guarantees in
a remote setting without asking the voters to do too much work.
Our proposal uses a diﬀerent method of combining the beneﬁts of
cryptographic-style veriﬁcation with randomised, publicly-observable checking
of paper records. The rough idea is that each voter produces a human-readable
paper record, and a (non-human-readable) encrypted record. Voters check that
the former matches their intention, and submit the latter into a process of public
auditing which veriﬁes that with high probability the encrypted records match
the paper ones. The following section describes the background assumptions. We
then provide an overview of the protocol, followed by some important details,
then a discussion of some possible variants.
2 Assumptions and Requirements
Some simple assumptions about voting:
1. The electoral authorities maintain an accurate list of who is eligible to vote,
2. There is a public list linking a public key to each eligible voter.
Some more complex assumptions about postal voting in particular:
3. There is suﬃcient observation or proper process at the vote receiving location
to ensure that votes are not lost upon arrival and some observable procedures
are followed.
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We will require an unpredictable coin toss for each received vote. The trick is
to design a process that provides good counted-as-cast evidence to observers.
See below.
4. There is an irrevocable process for separating pieces of paper that arrive in
the same envelope, from each other and from the envelope.
This process varies somewhat from one country to another, but is used
to separate the voter’s identity, usually on an external envelope, from the
contents of the vote, usually inside an(other) envelope. Traditionally the
vote is mixed in a box with other votes. We will also use this to separate
irrevocably pieces of paper that originated in the same envelope.
Like all end-to-end veriﬁable voting protocols, we assume we have a Bulletin
Board, which is an electronic authenticated write-only broadcast channel with
memory (“broadcast” means that everyone is guaranteed to see the same data).
Some requirements for the system:
1. Vote privacy. It should be infeasible to link individual voters to their vote.
However the system is not receipt-free (and hence not coercion resistant).
2. Eligibility Veriﬁability. The list of public keys of admitted voters is public.
3. Cast-as-intended (individual) veriﬁability. Voters should each have evidence
that their votes were cast as they intended.
4. Counted-as-cast veriﬁability. Each observer should each have evidence that
all votes were counted as they were cast. (Note that in end-to-end veriﬁable
systems this is veriﬁable by voters; here it is veriﬁable by any observer who
participates in the vote-opening protocol.) We have two diﬀerent variants
with diﬀerent assumptions for counted-as-cast veriﬁability—see Section 3.3.
5. Universally veriﬁable tallying. Voters and observers alike can verify the cor-
rect tallying of all cast votes.
The scheme aims to defend against:
1. An attacker who manipulates paper votes in transit.
This should be detected at audit time with probability at least 1/2.
2. A malicious voting device that misprints the plaintext paper record.
This should be detected by the voter.
3. A malicious voting device that manipulates the encrypted record
This should be detected at audit time with probability at least 1/2.
4. A collusion of some of the electoral authorities opening envelopes and their
observers.
One honest observer should be able to detect departure from the protocol.
It does not aim to defend against an attacker who drops postal votes—this
can be detected, but cannot be distinguished from “honest” failures of the mail
system. Nor does it defend against a complete collusion of all electoral author-
ities and all of the observers at envelope-opening time. In other words, at least
one observer must be honest. Although the scheme defends against either a ma-
licious voting device or an attacker who controls the postal voting channel, it
is susceptible to collusion between those two attackers. There is also a strong
assumption that the paper records, once received, are properly secured.
58 J. Benaloh, P.Y.A. Ryan, and V. Teague
3 The Proposal
Voters receive voting information, such as candidate names, electronically. They
ﬁll out their vote on their computer, and print three representations of it on
separate pieces of paper:
– VR, a human-readable plaintext vote,
– VE, an encrypted and signed representation of the vote, which identiﬁes (in
non-human-readable form) whose key it is signed with.
– VI, an encrypted but not signed representation of the vote, which is printed
along with two large random values:
• RI is the random value used to encrypt VR to produce VI,
• RE is the random value used to re-encrypt VI to produce VE.
(These values may or may not be encrypted—see below.)
All three printouts go in the same postal envelope.
Each voter retains a copy of VE as a receipt (in printed or electronic form),
but voters’ computers are supposed to delete VI and the random values used to
produce VI and VE.
The diﬃcult part is to allow any observers present at the opening of the voting
envelopes to get evidence that the votes are counted as cast, without compromis-
ing privacy. In other words, by checking that for each vote, VR and VE represent
the same thing. We will do this by using the intermediate representation VI. Ob-
servers randomly choose whether to get evidence that VI matches VR or that
VI matches VE. (This evidence consists of learning either RI or RE). The im-
plementation details could vary with the voting scheme and the requirements of
the paper delivery mechanism.
The result is similar to Randomised Partial Checking [JJR02]. On the bulletin
board go the complete list of plaintext votes VR1,VR2, . . . the complete list of
intermediate representations VI1,VI2, . . . the complete list of signed, encrypted
votes VE1,VE2, . . ., and, for each vote, either a value (RIi) proving the link
from VRi to VIi, or a value (REj) proving the link from VIj to VEj . Like RPC,
privacy is reasonable but imperfect: each vote is anonymised among half of the
set. See Figure 1.
The diﬃculty is to design an easy process for publishing (and proving) either
the link from VI to VE or the link from VI to VR, while hiding or destroying
the other link.
3.1 Details 1: How One Link Can Be Published and the Other
Destroyed
One possibility (from now on called the crypto option) is to encrypt both RE
and RI, print both encrypted values on the same piece of paper as VI, post both
encrypted values on the Bulletin Board, and then decrypt only the one that is
selected. The other value remains encrypted and hence does not reveal the link
between VI and the other data item (VR or VE).
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VR Physical shuﬄe or proven link VI Physical shuﬄe or proven link VE
VR2 —————–link (RI2)———— VI2
Physical Shuﬄe
VE8
VR5 —————–link (RI5)———— VI5 VE2
VR7 —————–link (RI7)———— VI7 VE7
VR8 —————–link (RI8)———— VI8 VE5
VR3
Physical Shuﬄe
VI4 —————–link (RE4)———— VE4
VR1 VI1 —————–link (RE1)———— VE1
VR4 VI3 —————–link (RE3)———— VE3
VR6 VI6 —————–link (RE6)———— VE6
Fig. 1. Information published on the Bulletin Board to demonstrate votes are counted
as cast
A second possibility (from now on called the paper option) is to use physical
paper mechanisms to separate and destroy the unused value. For example, RI
and RE could each be printed on its own separate piece of paper. The selected
value could then be attached to VI and published, while the unselected value
was shredded. Alternatively, both values could be printed on the same piece of
paper as VI, but the unused one could be detached and shredded.
These two options seem to achieve the same eﬀect. The ﬁrst option involves
more cryptographic work; the second involves more ﬁddling with pieces of paper.
The structure of the protocol is the same in each case.
3.2 The Rest of the Protocol
When the envelopes arrive at the electoral authority:
1. For each envelope, the signature on VE is veriﬁed without revealing to ob-
servers whose signature it is.
2. For each envelope, a coin is tossed which determines whether observers will
later get a link from VR to VI, or a link from VI to VE. The piece of paper
containing VI is accordingly stapled to either VE or VR, depending on the
coin toss.
If we are using the paper option, the appropriate random value (RE prov-
ing VI matches VE or RI proving VI matches VR) must also be stapled to
VI, while the other value is shredded. With the crypto option both encrypted
values and VI are printed on the same piece of paper and don’t need special
treatment here.
3. When all envelopes are opened there are four (nearly) equally large piles of
paper:
(a) VR with VI and (possibly encrypted) RI stapled to it,
(b) VR without VI stapled to it,
(c) VE with VI and (possibly encrypted) RE stapled to it,
(d) VE without VI stapled to it.
Each is shuﬄed in an ordinary ballot box, then retained as evidence.
4. The pile of VR with VI stapled to it has its RI values (proving the equivalence
of VI and VR) published on the Bulletin Board. If we are using the crypto
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option the encrypted value is published, then provably decrypted.1 (The
unused value doesn’t need to be published, and should never be decrypted.)
5. The pile of VE with VI stapled to it has its RE values (proving the equiva-
lence of VI and VE) published on the Bulletin Board. The crypto option is
the same as for the VR with VI pile.
6. The other data contained in the other two paper piles (the lists of VR and
VE unlinked to their corresponding VI) is also published on the Bulletin
Board.
7. The list of encrypted, signed votes are cryptographically mixed (or homo-
morphically tallied) and veriﬁably decrypted.
Everyone can verify the proofs, but of course the cast-as-intended evidence
depends on the coins being properly tossed so that the match of VR with the
electronic data is veriﬁed.
Some care needs to be taken for the ﬁrst of the above steps, i.e. verifying the
signatures at envelope-opening time without revealing to the observers whose
signature it was, or to the (electronic) signature reader which vote it was. En-
suring this separation is crucial for privacy, and has to be enforced procedurally.
The signature would be in a format (such as a QR code) that’s prohibitively dif-
ﬁcult for humans to read or remember by sight. The electronic signature reader
would scan only the signature on VE, and the observers would be forbidden from
pointing technological devices at the ballots.
3.3 Details 2: How the Random Bit Selection for Each Ballot
Should Be Performed
There are various sources of randomness. It’s important that the source is un-
predictable to whichever attacker tries to manipulate the vote. Here are two
example sources:
The Voter, Using a Combination of the Electronic and Paper Chan-
nels. Individual cast-as-intended and counted-as-cast veriﬁability could be
achieved by having voters themselves make the “random” selections as to which
of RI or RE will be revealed after their ballots have been printed. This could be
accomplished by explicitly indicating which of the two links should be revealed
(perhaps by ticking a separate box). Dilligent voters could remember which of
RI and RE they had selected and see on the subsequent public postings that the
correct one had been revealed.
One problem with this apporach is that humans are notoriously poor at mak-
ing random selections, and this would need to be accounted for along with cases
where no selection is made.
1 It isn’t entirely clear that a proof of correct decryption is necessary here given that
we’ve assumed the paper trail is properly guarded after being received at the electoral
commission. However, it seems important not to introduce an opportunity to pretend
it matched a value diﬀerent form what the voter saw.
Veriﬁable Postal Voting 61
A physical method of obtaining randomness from voters could work well here.
The ordering or orientation in which the ballot paper(s) are placed in the en-
velope could be used as a source of random selections. (There are at least four
distinct and easily distinguished orientations in which a — folded or unfolded —
rectangular piece of paper can be placed in a slightly larger rectangular envelope.
Two simple classes can be whether the leftmost printing of the front of the ballot
is placed against the leftmost or rightmost printing of the front of the envelope.)
Since every ballot must be oriented somehow within the envelope, there would
always be a “random” selection — presumably not known in advance by the
voter’s computer. Knowledgeable voters could take note of this orientation and
check that the correct value is subsequently revealed.
However, this approach has one important weakness: an attacker who controls
the postal system (and can open envelopes and reseal them) can see which VR
records will not be checked against VI. This allows the possibility of substituting
VR undetectably. (A full mix and decryption of VE records will detect the
anomaly—it just won’t be clear what caused the problem, or which result is
correct. See Section 5 for a longer discussion.)
It is preferable to ask the voter to send one bit in the paper envelope, and a
separate bit electronically (via the same machine that they use for vote printing).
The checking of VI against VR or VE could then be chosen by taking the XOR
of that voter’s two bits. The aim would be to prevent the machine from learning
the “paper” bit (and hence manipulating the electronic bit and the encrypted
records), and prevent anyone who intercepted the paper record from knowing
the electronic bit (and manipulating the paper bit and paper record).
Voters could access their VE records and verify that the correct links had been
opened. This reduces the trust assumptions on the observers to not knowing the
electronic bit in advance, and not manipulating the paper records afterwards.
The Observers or Electoral Authorities Jointly, Using Jointly Gen-
erated Data and Data from the Vote. We could do a more traditional
distributed randomness generation, either using cryptographic joint coin-tossing
or the sort of machine used in lotto. In this case we’re assuming that at least
one observer at the receiving end honestly inputs some randomness, and there’s
a commonly available PRNG to expand the seed into a string of random bits.2
This could be applied to ballots in some predetermined order, or combined with
some randomness generated from the ballot itself. There are two options:
– ballot order: The ballot order would be ﬁxed in advance, or drawn at
random. The seed would be used to generate a pseudorandom string which
was applied to each ballot choice in turn.
– ballot contents: The bit would be (part of) the output of a hash of both
the seed and some data on the ballot. One possibility is to use only data
2 One concrete possibility is to use Stark’s tools for generating randomness for risk-
limiting audits, available at
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Java/Html/ballotPollTools.htm
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from VE, in which case anyone can use the data on the Bulletin Board to
check that the correct link has been opened for each vote.
This reduces the trust assumptions on the observers to not arranging the
envelopes with knowledge of their contents, and not manipulating the paper
records afterwards.
Comparison of Approaches to Random Bit Selection. One way to com-
pare the proposals is to think about an attacker with unsupervised access to a
ballot at diﬀerent times. Our attacker wants to substitute VR.
– If the attacker has the ballot before the envelope has arrived at the vote
receiving location, and before the seed has been generated, then (with either
method) the attack has at least a 1/2 chance of being detected.
– If the attacker has the ballot after the seed has been generated, and before it
arrives at the vote receiving location (or before it’s been properly accepted
into a secure storage area), then with the “ballot contents” scheme the at-
tacker knows which half of the ballots can be safely manipulated; with the
“ballot order” scheme the attacker also has to arrange for the ballot order
to be manipulated.
– If the attacker has the ballot before the seed has been generated, then with
the “ballot contents” scheme the attack will still be detected with probability
1/2. With the “ballot order” scheme, the attacker will (still) need to collude
with someone who manipulates the ballot order.
– An attack on the scheme where the voter chooses two bits has at least a 1/2
chance of being detected, assuming that the electronically-sent bit is secret
and was randomly generated. (But this is possibly a too-strong assumption
given that people are not good at choosing random values or keeping secrets.)
The crucial point with the keyed scheme is not to generate the seed until all
the ballots are in, past the point where they’re subject to manipulation. One
option is to generate a new seed every day.
4 Privacy
Since voters mark their ballots electronically, there is no defence against eaves-
droppers or malware such as keyloggers resident on the voter’s computer system.
The system otherwise provides reasonable (though not perfect) privacy but is
not receipt-free. (We could encrypt the signature and the voter’s ID so that only
the electoral authority could identify whose it was. This would mitigate eaves-
dropping on the snail mail and not otherwise aﬀect the protocol, except that it
would require an additional decryption step when the vote arrives.)
When the envelopes are opened, all of the vote and identiﬁcation data are
present together. At the time the signature is veriﬁed electronically, the vote
information is not supposed to be available to the electronic system. When the
human-readable paper vote is exposed, the observers are not supposed to learn
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the identity of the signature that is being veriﬁed. Both of these need to be
enforced by procedural mechanisms as the envelopes are being opened and the
pieces of paper stapled together. Similarly, the proper shuﬄing of each of the
four piles of paper is necessary for breaking the links between corresponding
elements.
Voters are obviously supposed to erase VI and its associated
randomisation/re-encryption factors. If they remember this data then they can
prove how they voted. This is why the protocol is not receipt-free.
5 Verifiability
Cast-as-intended veriﬁability is achieved very straightforwardly by letting each
voter print a human-readable vote VR and check it before placing it in the
envelope. Universally veriﬁable tallying is achieved by publishing the paper votes
in cleartext, so they can be tallied directly. Voters check that their electronic
records have been properly received by looking up VE on the Bulletin Board.
Counted-as-cast veriﬁability consists of checking that VE matches VR. This
is done by allowing observers to choose randomly whether to get a proof of VI
matching VE or VR. Of course the quality of this assurance depends on the
randomness. If the two options are chosen randomly and independently then
the probability of successfully manipulating votes decreases exponentially with
the number of manipulations. We have described two diﬀerent proposals which
give evidence of proper random generation to diﬀerent sets of observers. One
gives each individual voter control over their own random bit selection; the
second gives a group of observers evidence about the proper bit selection of the
collection of votes.
This system could be have been designed as two independent partially-
veriﬁable systems: a simple paper system of electronic ballot delivery and
(human-readable) paper returns, plus a (non-human-readable) computerised sys-
tem in which the voter can use cryptography to verify proper inclusion and tal-
lying, but not that their vote was cast as they intended. We could have simply
compared the paper count to the cryptographically veriﬁable electronic tally
and declared success if they matched. Numerous cryptographic schemes exist
that are truly universally veriﬁable (e.g. [CGS97], [SK95]), and ensure that the
probability of a single undetectable vote substitution by the authorities would
be exponentially small. However, there is no cast-as-intended veriﬁcation: if the
electronic tally diﬀered from the paper records, it would not be clear whether
the paper record had been manipulated, or a malicious voting computer had
sent the wrong vote.
The problem, of course, is that in any practical election they’d be unlikely
to match perfectly, and it would be impossible to understand what had gone
wrong. This would raise unanswerable questions about which tally to accept—
the answer would depend on a guess about what had caused the inconsistency.
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The auditing step suggested here, in which each ballot is checked for con-
sistency between its encrypted and human-readable versions, ensures that the
paper and electronic counts are very unlikely to diﬀer by much. This should
obviate the need to decide whether it’s the paper count or the electronic count
that’s the “true” count.
There is still a ﬁrm assumption about proper care of the physical paper evi-
dence, particularly the half that’s not cryptographically linked to VI. This seems
unavoidable with a simple VVPAT.
Although the scheme defends against an attacker who controls either the
voting device or the postal channel, it does not defend against colluding attackers
who control both. The malicious device could print a human-readable record that
matches the voter’s intention, but encrypted electronic records for a diﬀerent
choice, then the attacker could switch the human-readable record in the mail.
6 Other Variants and Discussion
It would be possible to ask voters to send VE electronically to the electoral
authorities (as well as the printed version). This increases the complexity, but
also has the beneﬁt that the count could commence much sooner. It could be
possible to mix and tally electronically “optimistically,” meaning that the elec-
tronic record would be used, but the paper records would subject to audit in
close races, or kept in case of a dispute.
One important practical complication is that some electronically delivered
votes will not subsequently appear in paper form, due to failure of the mail.
It’s unclear what to do in this situation, but the simplest defensible thing is
not to count them. (The alternative is to count them anyway, but then there is
no cast-as-intended veriﬁability.) Hence the authorities must at least open each
envelope and check which votes have arrived.
Another design direction worth investigating is to attempt to achieve everlast-
ing privacy [MN10] by using perfectly hiding commitments rather than encryp-
tions of VI and VE. This would mean that integrity depended on a computational
assumption (that a computationally binding commitment could not be opened
in more than one way), but this could be a reasonable tradeoﬀ, especially since
integrity depends on distributed randomness generation and associated proce-
dures here anyway. It would require a way of either adapting or omitting the
electronic tallying step.
7 Conclusion
This system makes strong, but observable procedural assumptions for both ver-
iﬁability and privacy, but almost all parts of the process are individually or
universally veriﬁable. This represents a reasonable tradeoﬀ among the conﬂict-
ing requirements of remote voting.
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